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Abstract: 
In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery 1L  to 
lottery 2L  when the probability that 1L  delivers a better outcome than 2L  is higher than the 
probability that 2L  delivers a better outcome than 1L . Such a preference can be rationalized 
by three standard axioms (solvability, convexity and symmetry) and one less standard axiom 
(a fanning-in). A preference for the most probable winner can be represented by a skew-
symmetric bilinear utility function. Such a utility function has the structure of a regret theory 
when lottery outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of regret aversion is 
replaced with a preference for a win. The empirical evidence supporting the proposed system 
of axioms is discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
An individual has menu-dependent preferences when his preference between two 
choice options depends on the availability of additional options (content of the choice set). 
The literature often describes such preferences as “context-dependent” (e.g. Stewart et al, 
2003, Tversky and Simonson, 1993). The context of a choice situation is a very general 
concept, however, that can be also used to describe aspects other than the content of a choice 
set. A more suitable term to describe a very specific phenomenon—the dependence of 
individual preferences on the menu of a choice set—is menu-dependence.  
In choice under risk (Knight, 1921), a special type of menu-dependent preference is a 
preference for a lottery that is most probable to outperform all other feasible lotteries. The 
literature refers to such a preference as “a preference for probabilistically prevailing lottery” 
(e.g. Bar-Hillel and Margalit, 1988) or “the criterion of the maximum likelihood to be the 
greatest” (e.g. Blyth, 1972). Recent experimental evidence suggests that a preference for most 
probable winner prevails in binary choice between lottery frequencies of equal expected 
value (Blavatskyy, 2003) and in small feedback-based problems (e.g. Barron and Erev, 2003, 
Blavatskyy, 2003a). In this paper, I build a system of axioms rationalizing a preference for 
most probable winner in binary choice.  
Given the probability distributions of any two independent lotteries it is always 
possible to calculate directly the (relative) probability of each lottery to outperform the other. 
Such calculation requires little cognitive effort when the state space (a joint distribution of 
lotteries) is available. Blavatskyy (2003) provides experimental evidence that a preference for 
most probable winner emerges when an individual follows a simple majority rule—to pick up 
a lottery that gives a better outcome in the majority of (equally probable) states of the world. 
In such a cognitively undemanding environment it is plausible to assume that an individual 
follows a simple behavioral rule—he calculates the relative probabilities of each lottery to 
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win over the other lotteries and then maximizes among those probabilities. This behavioral 
rule (the heuristic of relative probability comparisons) resembles one-reason fast and frugal 
decision making (e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). Like all heuristics, it ignores some of 
the available information by treating lottery outcomes as ordinal. Additionally, like all 
heuristics, this behavioral rule applies only to a bounded subset of decision problems, e.g. 
when lotteries have equal or similar expected values.  
In cognitively demanding environments, a straightforward calculation of relative 
probabilities of a lottery to win over others, however, demands more cognitive effort. 
Examples include situations when probability information is presented visually (e.g. Tversky, 
1969) or not presented at all (e.g. Barron and Erev, 2003), when lotteries have many 
outcomes or an individual faces a choice among many lotteries. Nevertheless, assuming an 
individual preference for most probable winner it is possible to explain observed decision 
making in such environments, as demonstrated in Blavatskyy (2003a) in his alternative 
explanation of the data in Barron and Erev (2003).  
Since individuals are likely to use only simple rules of thumb (e.g. Gigerenzer et al., 
1999), a descriptive fit of a preference for most probable winner in cognitively demanding 
decision environments can be explained only through a general theory of preference. Unlike a 
heuristic approach that describes a plausible psychological process underlying observed 
decision making (e.g. Newell and Shanks, 2003), a theory of preference states that an 
individual has an underlying preference for most probable winner. The purpose of this paper 
is to explore the theoretical properties of an individual’s preference for most probable winner, 
and how it is related to various non-expected utility theories (e.g. Starmer, 2000). 
Specifically, the paper explores what normative axioms are necessary and sufficient for 
rationalizing such preference, and how those axioms accord with the experimental evidence. 
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The proposed axiomatization provides theoretical insights into an individual’s 
preference for most probable winner and highlights some surprising connections to other 
decision theories. It also provides “thought experiment” evidence for a descriptive validity of 
the theory (e.g. Friedman and Savage, 1952, Machina, 1982). However, “thought 
experiment” evidence can be drastically different from actual decision making (e.g. Tversky, 
1969). Therefore, the paper also focuses on the experimental evidence supposedly 
documenting the systematic violation of the proposed axioms.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the system 
of axioms and derives a utility function representation and family of indifference curves. The 
descriptive validity of the proposed axioms is discussed in section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The system of axioms 
2.1. Basic definitions 
An option A is strictly preferred to option B, or BA ! , if an individual chooses A and 
is not willing to choose B from the choice set ! "BA, . An individual is indifferent between 
choice options A and B, or BA ~ , if the choice of A and the choice of B are equally possible 
from the choice set ! "BA, . 
This paper deals with individuals’ binary choices between discrete lotteries. The set of 
lottery outcomes ! "nxx ,...X 1#  is finite and ordered in such a way that nxx "" ...1 . Outcomes 
are not necessarily monetary (measured in reals). They are only required to be strictly ordered 
in terms of subjective preference. A lottery $ %nppL ,...,1  is defined as a mapping & 'nL 1,0X: # , 
where & '1,0(ip  is the probability of occurrence of outcome ix , & 'ni ,1(  and 1
1
#)
#
n
i
ip .  
In a joint independent distribution of any two lotteries $ %nppL ,...,11  and $ %nqqL ,...,12  
only three events are possible: 1L  delivers a better outcome than 2L  (state 21 LL * ), 2L  
delivers a better outcome than 1L  (state 12 LL * ) and lotteries 21, LL  deliver the same 
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outcome (state 21 LL # ). An individual has a preference for most probable winner when 
equation (1) holds for any two lotteries 1L  and 2L . This decision rule is rationalized below.  
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In the remainder of this paper each pair of lotteries is assumed to be statistically 
independent. This assumption is not restricting the normative or descriptive applications of 
the model. A preference for most probable winner is easily extendable on the domain of acts 
(Savage, 1954) In a binary choice between two acts an individual recodes the outcome of 
each act as a relative gain (e.g. +1) or a relative loss (e.g. -1) and then chooses the act that 
yields a relative gain with the highest probability. Such rule of thumb is intuitively plausible 
and cognitively undemanding. Therefore, there is no apparent reason for axiomatizing such 
preference when a joint distribution of lotteries (state space) is given. On the contrary, a 
preference for most probable winner over independent lotteries is not immediately appealing. 
This is the main reason why this axiomatization is restricted to independent lotteries. 
2.2. Standard axioms 
This section presents a set of axioms that were already used in other axiomatizations 
of decision theories (e.g. Fishburn 1982, 1988). Notably, this set of standard axioms does not 
contain the transitivity axiom. Indeed, a preference for most probable winner can be intransi-
tive (e.g. Blyth, 1972). Intuitively, the structure of such preference is foremost based on the 
relative (binary) comparisons rather than on a separate (menu-independent) evaluation of 
lotteries. For example, lottery 1L  that yields €4 Euro with probability $ % 618.0215 3+#4  
and €1 otherwise is more probable to deliver a higher outcome than €3. Lottery 2L  that yields 
€2 with probability 4  and €5 otherwise is more probable to deliver a lower outcome than €3. 
However, 2L  delivers a higher outcome than 1L  with probability 4 . Hence, a preference for 
most probable winner does not necessarily impose a transitive order on lotteries. 
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Axiom 1 (Solvability) For any three lotteries 321 ,, LLL  such that 21 LL !  and 32 LL !  there 
is a number $ %1,0(5  such that $ % 231 ~1 LLL 55 +6  
Axiom 2 (Convexity) For any three lotteries 321 ,, LLL  and for any number $ %1,0(5 : 
a) if 21 LL !  and 31 LL 7  then $ % 321 1 LLL 55 +6! , 
b) if 21 ~ LL  and 31 ~ LL  then $ % 321 1~ LLL 55 +6 , 
c) if 21 LL !  and 23 LL 7  then $ % 231 1 LLL !55 +6 . 
Axiom 3 (Symmetry) For any three lotteries 321 ,, LLL  such that 21 LL ! , 32 LL ! , 31 LL ! , 
312 5.05.0~ LLL 6  and for any number $ %1,0(5 : 
$ % 2131 5.05.0~1 LLLL 6+6 55  if and only if $ % 2313 5.05.0~1 LLLL 6+6 55 . 
Fishburn (1982, 1988) proved the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 Axioms 1-3 hold if and only if there is a skew-symmetric function 
RXX: 89:  (unique up to a multiplication by a positive constant) such that for any two 
lotteries $ %nppL ,...,11  and $ %nqqL ,...,12 : 21 LL !  if and only if $ % 0,
1 1
*))
# #
n
i
n
j
jiji xxqp :  
2.3. A fanning-in axiom 
A fanning-in axiom assumes a particular type of diminishing sensitivity to probability. 
Specifically, when probability mass is largely shifted to the best or the worst outcome, tiny 
probabilities attached to the intermediate outcomes become progressively unimportant for 
decision. This axiom has not been used in other axiomatizations in the literature. 
Axiom 4 (A fanning-in) For any lottery 1L  that delivers ix  with probability ip  and nx  
otherwise, and for any lottery 2L  that delivers ij xx *  with probability jp  and nx  otherwise, 
such that 21 ~ LL : 1lim0 #8 ijp ppi
. For any lottery 3L  that delivers kx  with probability kp  
and 1x  otherwise, and for any lottery 4L  that delivers kl xx *  with probability lp  and 1x  
otherwise, such that 43 ~ LL : 1lim0 #8 lkp ppl
. 
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To understand the logic behind axiom 4, consider first the situation when 08ip . 
First of all, notice that ij pp *  because nji xxx "" . If 08ip , lottery 1L  approaches to 
the lottery $ %1,0,...,0L , which gives the best possible outcome nx  for sure. Since there could 
be no other lottery 2
~L  such that LL ~~2  it must be the case that 0lim0 #8 jp pi
. When two 
lotteries 21 , LL  approach to the lottery L  the absolute differences in tiny probabilities 
attached to the not-best outcome disappear. Axiom 4 additionally requires that the relative 
differences in probabilities attached to the not-best outcome also disappear as 1L  and 2L  
become increasingly similar to L  i.e. 1lim
0
#
8 ijp
pp
i
.  
Expected utility theory violates axiom 4 because it implies that 1lim
0
*
8 ijp
pp
i
. If all 
outcomes are either gains or losses, cumulative prospect theory satisfies axiom 4 only in a 
special case when 
$ % $ %
$ % $ %jn
n
p xuxu
xuxu
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;
;
;
; +
8
1
1
1
lim << , where $ %p<  is the probability weighting 
function and $ %.u  is value function (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). When 1lim
0
#
8 ijp
pp
i
 
then an individual’s indifference curves plotted in the probability triangle1 (e.g. Machina, 
1982) are not parallel but fanning-in, which explains the name of the axiom. The assumption 
1lim
0
#
8 ijp
pp
i
 also implies that an individual becomes infinitely risk seeking when 
probability mass is largely shifted to the best outcome.   
The second part of axiom 4 assumes that the above logical argument applies as well to 
the situation when lotteries $ %0,...,0,,0,...,0,13 kk ppL +  and $ %0,...,0,,0,...,0,14 ll ppL + , 
43 ~ LL , approach to the lottery $ %0,...,0,1L , which gives the worst possible outcome 1x  for 
                                                           
1 Note that lotteries 21 , LL , although defined as probability distributions over n outcomes, have non-zero 
probabilities attached only to three outcomes nji xxx ,, . Therefore, lotteries 21 , LL  can be plotted in the 
probability triangle based only on outcomes nji xxx ,, .   
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sure. The only difference is that an individual becomes infinitely risk averse when probability 
mass is largely shifted to the worst outcome. The implication of axiom 4 that an individual 
becomes risk seeking (averse) when probability mass is largely shifted to the best (worst) 
outcome is the counterpart of Machina’s intuition for universal fanning out (Machina, 1987 
pp. 129-130). As shown in the proof of theorem 2 below the intuitive role of axiom 4 is “to 
erase” the cardinal difference between lottery outcomes. An individual who maximizes the 
probability of a relative gain ignores the information about the size of this gain i.e. he or she 
treats lottery outcomes in an ordinal way. 
Theorem 2 Axioms 1-4 hold if and only if equation (1) holds for any two lotteries 1L  and 2L .  
! Proof is presented in the appendix. ! 
Theorem 2 implies that an individual’s preference for most probable winner is a 
special case of the skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory (e.g. Fishburn, 1982, 1988). The 
addition of a fanning-in axiom restricts a general skew-symmetric bilinear functional derived 
by Fishburn so that only the ordinal difference in lottery outcomes is taken into account. 
When lotteries are distributed independently, skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory 
coincides with regret theory (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987). When the anticipated net 
advantage function of regret theory is ordinal in outcomes (e.g. equation (5) in the appendix), 
the decision rule of regret theory reduces to a preference for most probable winner. However, 
such “ordinal” function $ %ji xx ,:  always violates a key assumption of regret theory, regret 
aversion, which requires $ % $ % $ %zyyxzxzyx ,,, ::: 6*=**>  (e.g. Loomes et al., 1992). 
In terms of regret theory the “ordinal” function $ %ji xx ,:  of a preference for most probable 
winner always reflects regret seeking: $ % $ % $ %zyyxzxzyx ,,, ::: 6?=**> . 
Figure 1 plots the map of the indifference curves representing a preference for most 
probable winner inside the probability triangle (Machina, 1982). The same map of 
indifference curves is implied by the weighted utility theory when the weight of the medium 
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outcome is greater than unity (e.g. Chew and Waller, 1986). Notice that this indifference map 
is independent of individual-specific parameters (functions) and cardinal measures of lottery 
outcomes i.e. the map is invariant for all triples of lottery outcomes such that 321 xxx "" . 
The family of indifference curves implied by axioms 1-4 consists of straight lines with 
different slopes reflecting a changing individual attitude towards risk Specifically, a universal 
fanning-in, as in figure 1, shows that an individual becomes more risk seeking (averse) when 
probability mass is shifted to the best (worst) outcome, which Chew and Waller (1986) call 
“the heavy hypothesis”.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that an individual is risk neutral along the 45@ line on figure 1 i.e. 
he or she is exactly indifferent between a medium outcome for sure and a 50%-50% chance of 
the best and the worst outcome. This is a direct consequence of the symmetry axiom. The 
symmetry axiom probably gains the most of its intuitive appeal when lottery outcomes are 
“similar” to each other. Hence, a preference for most probable winner is especially appealing 
when lotteries have equal or similar expected values.  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
 
Figure 1 Family of indifference curves inside the probability triangle 
Probability of the worst outcome 1x
Probability 
of the best 
outcome 3x  
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3. Descriptive validity of proposed axioms 
This section critically reviews the existing experimental evidence on the alleged 
violations of the four proposed axioms. To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies 
documenting any systematic violations of axiom 1 (solvability).  
3.1. Violations of betweenness 
Part b) of Axiom 2 (convexity) implies a betweenness axiom. Betweenness axiom 
states that if an individual is indifferent between two lotteries than a probability mixture of 
these two lotteries is equally good. A casual survey of the experimental literature from the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s that tested betweenness suggests that it is not a descriptive axiom. 
However, when this empirical evidence is thoroughly examined, a more favorable picture 
emerges. The literature on stochastic utility (Loomes and Sugden 1998) reached a generic 
conclusion that some behavioral patterns, which appear as a systematic violation of a certain 
principle when taken at a face value, may actually support the principle once a stochastic 
specification is allowed. This generic conclusion applies to the case of betweenness.  
3.1.1. Experimental evidence on betweenness 
Coombs and Huang (1976) (experiment 1), Chew and Waller (1986), Camerer (1989), 
Battalio et al. (1990), Gigliotti and Sopher (1993) (experiments 1 and 3) and Camerer and Ho 
(1994) find that approximately 68% of subjects respect betweenness. The remaining subjects 
are split between quasi-convex (i.e. they dislike randomization) and quasi-concave (i.e. they 
like randomization) preferences approximately in a (non-corresponding) proportion of 24% to 
8%. This alleged systematic violation of betweenness emerges when some lotteries used in 
the experiment are located on the edges of the probability triangle. Coombs and Huang 
(1976) (experiment 2), Camerer (1992), Starmer (1992) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1993) 
(experiment 2) find that approximately 76% of subjects respect betweenness and a split 
between quasi-convex and quasi-concave preferences is non-systematic (approximately in a 
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non-corresponding proportion of 14% to 10%) when all of the lotteries used in the 
experiment are located inside the probability triangle.  
Prelec (1990) finds that 76% of subjects reveal quasi-concave preferences and only 
24% of subjects respect betweenness when the probability mass of the hypothetical lotteries 
is largely shifted to the worst outcome. Camerer and Ho (1994) replicate this result for one 
lottery triple “TUV” with real payoffs. Bernasconi (1994) finds a strong asymmetric violation 
of betweenness when betweenness is not a modal choice pattern in two lottery pairs (1 and 3). 
3.1.2. A reexamination of experimental methodology 
All studies mentioned in section 3.1.1 employ the same method to test betweenness. 
The subjects are asked to choose their most preferred lottery from three sets ! "21, LL , ! "ML ,1  
and ! "ML ,2 , where $ % 21 1 LLM 55 +6# , $ %1,0(5 , and 1L , 2L  are arbitrary lotteries. Earlier 
studies typically consider only the first and the second pairwise choices. A particular fallacy 
of such a truncated experimental procedure is discussed below. If a probability mixture 
$ % 21 1 LL 55 +6  is frequently (almost never) chosen in the second and third pairwise choices it 
has been interpreted as an evidence of quasi-concave (quasi-convex) preferences. 
Consider a situation when the true preference of an individual is consistent with 
betweenness but it is distorted by an occasional random error. The distorting effect of an error 
is stronger when an individual chooses between the lotteries that have similar utility. This 
stochastic specification appears in Hey and Orme (1994), Camerer and Ho (1994) and Wu 
and Gonzalez (1996). For an alternative stochastic utility model, see Harless and Camerer 
(1994) p. 1261 who propose a constant choice-independent error rate.  
A probability mixture M is located between lotteries 1L  and 2L  in terms of subjective 
utility, i.e. lotteries 1L  and 2L  are more distinct in terms of utility than lotteries M and 1L  or 
M and 2L . Therefore, the impact of a random error is more significant when an individual 
chooses between M and 1L  ( 2L ) than when an individual chooses between 1L  and 2L . 
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Alternatively, one can argue that the strength of an individual’s preference relation is greater 
when an individual chooses between 1L  and 2L  (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1995).  
Stochastic betweenness implies relation (2) where A  stands for 7?#* ,,,  or B .  
$ % $ %$ % 5.0Prob
Prob
Prob
1
2
21 AA ML
LM
LL
!
!
!   (2) 
If an individual respects stochastic betweenness, a choice pattern when M is chosen either 
from the set ! "ML ,1  or from the set ! "ML ,2  (but not from both) should be a modal (most 
frequent) choice pattern. Additionally, if $ % $ %MLLM !! 12 ProbProb * , M is more 
frequently chosen from the sets ! "ML ,1  and ! "ML ,2 , which appears as if the evidence of 
quasi-concave preferences. If $ % $ %MLLM !! 12 ProbProb ? , M is less frequently chosen from 
the sets ! "ML ,1  and ! "ML ,2 , which appears as if the evidence of quasi-convex preferences.  
However, it is misleading to interpret these results as a systematic violation of 
betweenness. Both of these choice patterns are consistent with stochastic betweenness. A 
persuasive evidence of the systematic violations of betwenness would have been an 
asymmetric split between quasi-convex and quasi-concave preferences when betweenness is 
not a modal choice pattern. However, as described in section 3.1.1., such violations are rare.  
If an asymmetric split between quasi-convex and quasi-concave preferences is caused 
by random errors, this split should be more symmetric when 5.0#5 , and more asymmetric 
when 5  is close to zero or one. Indeed, a highly asymmetric split between quasi-convex and 
quasi-concave preferences reported in Prelec (1990) and Camerer and Ho (1994) (triple 
TUV) is elicited for 171#5 , in Bernasconi (1994)—for 05.0#5  and 95.0#5 . 
Moreover, all empirical studies using 5.0#5  except Camerer and Ho (1994) consider 
a binary choice only from two sets ! "21, LL  and ! "ML ,1 . An individual then reveals “as if” 
quasi-concave preference 21 LLM !! , if  $ % $ %MLLL !! 121 ProbProb * . He or she reveals 
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“as if” quasi-convex preference MLL !! 12 , if  $ % $ %MLLL !! 121 ProbProb ? . Thus, a 
more frequent incidence of quasi-concave (quasi-convex) preferences is observed when 
$ % 5.0Prob 21 *LL !  ( $ % 5.0Prob 21 ?LL ! ). In the extreme case when $ % 99.0Prob 21 #LL !  
there may be still some chance to observe “as if” quasi-concave preferences 21 LLM !!  but 
almost no chance at all to observe “as if quasi-convex” preferences MLL !! 12 . 
3.2. Evidence for fanning-in 
A survey of experiments testing the shape of individuals’ indifference curves suggests 
that there is a non-negligible evidence for fanning-out going back to the Allais paradox (e.g. 
Allais, 1953) and common consequence and common ratio effects (Starmer, 2000). However, 
a universal fanning-out hypothesis (Machina, 1982) is rejected. There is a growing evidence 
that supports a universal fanning-in. This new evidence suggests that indifference curves tend 
to fan in when the probability mass is associated with the best and the worst outcome and 
tend to fan out when the probability mass is associated with medium outcomes. In addition, 
the evidence for fanning-in in all regions of the probability triangle has recently emerged. 
Conlisk (1989) finds strong experimental support for the type of fanning-in implied 
by axiom 4 — 53% and 80% of subjects choose a more risky gamble in a common 
consequence problem when probability mass is largely shifted to the medium and the best 
outcome, correspondingly. This finding can be interpreted as an individual's indifference 
curves becoming almost horizontal when probability mass is largely shifted to the best 
outcome. Analogously, the so-called vertical fanning-in is documented in Starmer and 
Sugden (1989), Camerer (1989) p.92 and Battalio et al (1990). Wu and Gonzalez (1998) 
p.119 report a vertical fanning-in when the probability of the best outcome is above 0.33 and 
a vertical fanning-out when it is below 0.33.  
Prelec (1990) and Kagel et al. (1990) find fanning-in when probability mass is largely 
shifted to the worst outcome. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) report the so-called horizontal 
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fanning-in when a probability of the worst outcome is above 0.63 and a horizontal fanning-
out when it is below 0.63. Camerer (1989) p.92 finds a similar evidence for small gains.  
Bernasconi (1994) p.63 finds an experimental evidence for fanning-in by observing a 
reverse common ratio effect. Cubitt and Sugden (2001), Bosman and van Winden (2001) and 
Cubitt et al (2004) find an indirect evidence for a reverse common ratio effect in dynamic 
decision making under risk. Barron and Erev (2003) find a reverse common ratio effect in 
small feedback-based decision making. Battalio et al (1990) and Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
find an evidence for fanning-in i.e. an increased risk seeking for stochastically dominant 
lotteries when lotteries involve only guaranteed gains. Finally, Starmer (1992) and Humphrey 
and Verschoor (2004) find strong evidence consistent with a universal fanning-in in all 
regions of the probability triangle.  
The above literature elicits fanning-in/out of an individual’s indifference curves from 
an observed binary choice in a common consequence or common ratio problem involving 
lotteries typically defined on a common three-outcome structure. Therefore, the main findings 
from this literature can be summarized in the probability triangle presented in figure 2. 
                                      1 
 
 
Fanning-in 
Conlisk (1989), 
Camerer (1989),          
Starmer and Sudgen (1989), 
Battalio et al (1990), 
Starmer (1992),  
Wu and Gonzalez (1998) 
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Barron and Erev (2003) 
     0                                       2/3        1 
 
Figure 2 Empirical evidence for fanning-in 
Probability of the worst outcome  
Probability 
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outcome  
Fanning-in 
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5. Conclusions 
The proposed axiomatization explores theoretical features of an individual’s 
preference for most probable winner in a binary choice under risk. Although such preference 
is implied by a simplistic behavioral rule (the heuristic of relative probability comparisons), I 
find some surprising perhaps even unexpected connections with other decision theories 
(skew-symmetric bilinear utility, weighted utility and regret theory). A preference for most 
probable winner is rationalized by four axioms: solvability, convexity, symmetry and a 
fanning-in. Notably, transitivity of preferences is not required. The present paper deals with 
binary choice; a natural extension of this work is to axiomatize a preference for most 
probable winner in a choice among many lotteries. 
A preference for most probable winner falls into the betweenness class of decision 
theories that assume the linearity in probability of the sets ! " 00 ,~: LLLL > . The alleged 
systematic violations of betweenness found in the experimental literature in the late 1980’s 
and early 1990’s can be explained within the concept of a stochastic utility developed in the 
mid 1990’s. If the experimental evidence is reevaluated in the light of notions of stochastic 
utility, the betweenness axiom turns out to be quite descriptive.  
Experimental evidence also emerges for universal fanning-in of indifference curves. 
However, this evidence seems to be stronger for some areas of the probability triangle than 
for others. The experimental evidence for the system of axioms proposed here to rationalize 
an individual’s preference for most probable winner provides indirect evidence for the 
domain of applicability of the heuristic of relative probability comparisons.  
A preference for most probable is a special case of a skew-symmetric bilinear utility 
theory and regret theory when outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of regret 
aversion is replaced with a preference for a win. Thus, an individual’s preference for most 
probable winner is a simplified mirror image of regret theory. 
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Appendix 
Proof of theorem 2 
According to theorem 1, axioms 1-3 hold if and only if there is a skew-symmetric 
function $ %.,.:  such that for any two lotteries $ %nppL ,...,11  and $ %nqqL ,...,12 : 
$ % 0,
1 1
21 *2 ))
# #
n
i
n
j
jiji xxqpLL :! . For a specific pair of lotteries 1L  and 2L  described in the 
first part of axiom 4 the last statement can be rewritten as equation (3).  
$ % $ % $ % $ % $ % $ %$ % $ % 0,11,1,1,~ 21 #++6+6+62 nnjijnjinijijiji xxppxxppxxppxxppLL ::::  (3) 
The right hand side of (3) can be rewritten as equation (4). 
$ % $ % $ %
$ % $ % $ % $ % $ % $ %jnijiinninii
nninii
j xxpxxpxxpxxp
xxpxxpp
,1,,1,
,1,
::::
::
++++6
+6
#  (4) 
Taking the limit from both sides of (4) when 08ip  we obtain that 0lim0 #8 jp pi
 only 
if $ % 0, #nn xx: . Furthermore, 1lim0 #8 ijp ppi  if and only if $ % $ % $ %njjnni xxxxxx ,,, ::: #+#  
with the latter equality due to the skew-symmetric property of function $ %.,.: . Following the 
same argument for a pair of lotteries 3L  and 4L  described in the second part of axiom 4 we 
obtain that $ % $ %kl xxxx ,, 11 :: # , ! "nlk ,...,2, (> . Function $ %.,.:  then has the following form: 
$ %
C
D
C
E
F
?+
#
*
#
jia
ji
jia
xx ji 0,: , constaa #G ,0        (5) 
Intuitively, the addition of axiom 4 imposes ordinality on the Fishburn’s function $ %.,.: . 
Thus, axioms 1-4 hold if and only if for any two lotteries $ %nppL ,...,11  and $ %nqqL ,...,12 : 
$ % 0,
1 1
21 *2))
# #
n
i
n
j
jiji xxqpLL :! , where function  $ %.,.:  is defined by equation (5). This 
last statement is algebraically equivalent to equation (1). Q.E.D. 
